We consider a set of agents who have to choose one alternative among a finite set of social alternatives. A final allocation is a pair given by the selected alternative and the group of its users. Agents have crowding preferences over allocations: between any pair of allocations with the same alternative, they prefer the allocation with the largest number of users. We require that a decision be e cient and stable (which guarantees free participation in the group of users and free exit from it). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism
Introduction
In many collective choice problems, after the social alternative (or public good) has been chosen, agents may decide whether or not to use it. If the size of the final set of users a ects the welfare of each member, then the decision process has to take into account how many agents will eventually become users. In this paper we study the case when agents' preferences are positively a ected by the size of the set of users, and participation is not compulsory. There are many examples of such problems. Members of a club choose the amount of some non-rival public good to be provided to themselves and the cost of its provision is usually equally shared among the set of its final users. This choice a ects the composition (and the size) of the club, since some members may choose to leave the club if the level provided and its corresponding cost are unacceptable to them. Similarly, a local community which decides to provide a public facility (a swimming pool, a common garden, etc.) cannot set aside considerations regarding how many community members support this decision if those who are not in favor of it have the right not to pay for the facility.
Many other problems do not directly involve money but can be similarly modeled.
For instance members of a political party or a union decide which political line to follow and this decision a ects their choice regarding their membership. The size of the organization matters for all of its members, since it determines how e ective the organization is in pursing its objectives. A group of nations decides which common technological standard to adopt. Each country may prefer a di erent standard, but once a standard is adopted, social and individual welfare are increasing in the number of nations which agree to adopt it.
All these problems have two common features, other than the fact that agents care about how many other agents use the public good. The final allocation to be selected has to satisfy two properties: e ciency and stability. While the first requirement is well-known and typical in most of the public decision process, the latter deserves to be briefly mentioned. Stability requires that no agent can be forced to be a user and that no agent who wants to be a user could be excluded. Stability may be a necessary requirement due to institutional constraints (for instance, no nation can be forced to adopt any technological standard, or, according to the law, agents cannot be discriminated), but it is also a desirable property on the basis of normative principles like freedom (free participation) and equal treatment of equals (no discriminatory exclusion). 1 The aim of this paper is to implement an e cient and stable social choice function when agents' crowding preferences are private information.
Our analysis starts by showing that, for any crowding preference profile, the set of e cient and stable allocations is non-empty. However, we can easily establish a negative result: no e cient and stable social choice function is Nash implementable (and therefore neither strategy-proof) because it is not Maskin monotonic. This result is related to previous results in Jackson and Nicolò (2004) who study similar social choice problems in a context where agents have single-peaked preferences over an infinite and linearly ordered set of alternatives. They show that, in general, strategyproof and e cient social choice functions must fix the group of users and not allow it to vary with agents' preferences. Namely, when crowding e ects are present strategyproofness and e ciency impose that the group of users coincide with the entire society.
Therefore, stability is incompatible with strategy-proofness and e ciency. But this result suggests that the trade o between informational constraints and normative properties of social choice functions could be overcome if we separate the decision of which alternative has to be chosen from the selection of the group of its users. We therefore investigate if an e cient and stable social choice function is subgame perfect Nash implementable. We first show that one of the su cient conditions of subgame perfect Nash implementation in Moore and Repullo (1988) and Abreu and Sen (1990) does not hold in our framework. In particular, any e cient and stable social choice function does not satisfy the no veto power condition (that together with Condition and that the number of agents is larger or equal than three guarantees that a social choice function is subgame perfect Nash implementable). This is because stability gives to any agent the power (by not being a final user) to veto an allocation which is unanimously considered by all remaining agents as being the best one. We then present the implementation result which also holds for the case of two agents. The proposed two-stage game depends on an exogenously given order on the set of agents and on a selection rule choosing an alternative from every subset of alternatives.
Roughly, it is as follows. In the first stage of the game agents sequentially (iteratively and publicly), following the given order, propose a level of the public good and a natural number between 1 and the number of agents (interpreted as the number of users); among the proposed levels, one with the maximal number of users is chosen in accordance with the selection rule. In the second stage agents sequentially (and publicly), following the same given order, decide whether or not to use the level of the public good chosen at the first stage.
The game is relatively simple: it is finite, bounded, and the needed out-ofequilibrium penalties do not have to be large. Interestingly, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of the game does not depend on the order according to which agents make their decisions; hence, the implemented social choice function is anonymous. The mechanism selects among the set of e cient and stable allocations the alternative which maximizes the number of its users (if there are many, it selects the one chosen by a given selection rule). We justify this maximality property on a purely normative ground, since it allows to minimize the number of agents with the minimum level of welfare.
Finally, our paper is also related to Bag and Winter (1999) , in which the authors propose a sequential iterated mechanism to uniquely implement a core allocation for an economy with an excludable public good. In their model a level of a public good is produced using a technology and the contributions of a private good made by the final set of users. However, our setting is di erent from theirs at least with respect to the following features. First, in our setting exclusion is voluntary (our stability notion reflects that). Second, their setting is cardinal (preferences are quasilinear in the private good) while our ordinal setting not only admits a larger class of preferences but also admits problems in which the choice of a social alternative does not generate costs. Third, in their setting e ciency implies no exclusion, and thus, in the equilibrium outcome of their game all agents consume the public good; in contrast, in our setting e ciency may require that only a subset of agents is the final set of users of the public good.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we give preliminary notation and definitions, describe the preference domain, establish the existence of e cient and stable allocations, and provide a negative result for Nash implementation. In section 3, we describe the extensive-form game and state our main result. In section 4, we o er some examples that illustrate the role of some features of the extensive-game form, discuss on the non-neutrality of our mechanism, and give the relationship between the set of e cient and stable allocations and the set of group stable allocations. An Appendix at the end of the paper contains the proofs omitted in the text.
Preliminaries

Let
= {1 } be the set of agents and be the finite set of levels of a public good (or social alternatives 2 Finally, Strictness requires that agent is never indi erent between two di erent allocations with the properties that is a user of at least one of them and the two allocations di er either on the level of the public good and/or on the size of its users.
A preference relation satisfying these four properties is called a crowding preference relation and R denotes the set of all such preference relations for agent . Notice 2 Note that when the public good to be chosen has some type of externality, even those members who are not direct users may have strict preferences over which alternative has to be selected.
In these cases (Apa) turns to be a too restrictive assumption. Nevertheless in many interesting contexts, like the provision of club goods, it seems a natural assumption.
that all four conditions are agent specific and therefore R 6 = R for di erent agents and . Observe that the set of crowding preferences for agent admits preferences with very di erent trade-o s between the selected level of the public good and the size of its users; for instance, a crowding preference might well order ( { }) ( ).
A profile = ( 1 ) is a -tuple of crowding preference relations. Let 
Observe that (Apa) implies that if ( ) is internally stable then, implies Among the set of e cient and stable allocations we will be specially interested on those that have the largest set of users. Given R, define
Observe that since ( ) is non-empty and finite, ( ) 6 = for all R. We will refer to the set ( ) as the maximal participation set. In our setting the minimum level of welfare that any agent can get is the level that obtains in any allocation ( ) where In fact, stability guarantees that each agent can always refuse to use the public good and, by (Apa), all allocations where agent is not a user are indi erent for him. Maximality hence guarantees that the final allocation minimizes the number of agents with the minimum level of welfare. Therefore, it is a normative property inspired by a rawlsian maxmin principle.
A social choice function is a mapping : R × 2 selecting an allocation for each preference profile. A social choice function is e cient and stable if, for each R, the allocation ( ) is e cient and stable under .
Information about individual preferences is often not available to the decisionmaker. In addition, the institution under which the social decision has to be taken may give to each agent the right to claim as one's own any crowding preference (even if it is known that this is not the case). Therefore, if we want the choice of the allocation to be dependent on the preference profile (in the appropriate way to insure e ciency and stability), we have to design a mechanism to implement an e cient and stable social choice function. But it is easy to prove that no e cient and stable social choice function is Nash implementable in the set of profiles of crowding preference relations. Before stating this result we need some additional notation and definitions.
A mechanism (or game form) is a pair ( ) where relations. 4 Since negative implementation results on smaller domains are stronger, observe that the preference profile R and the preference relation
in the proof of Proposition 2 might be single-peaked. Hence, the proof of Proposition 2 shows that any e cient and stable social choice function defined on the domain of crowding and single-peaked preference relations is not fully Nash implementable.
The Implementation
Given the impossibility to implement any e cient and stable social choice function as Nash equilibria of a game in normal form, we now address the natural question whether it is possible to implement some of them as Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) of a game in extensive form. However, we will not be able to apply directly general results of the implementation theory because e cient and stable social choice functions do not satisfy one of the su cient conditions for SPNE implementation in 
for all 2 such that .
crowding preference profile such that for all 6 = 1, ( ) ( ) for all ( ) 6 = ( ) and ( ) 1 ( ) Let : R × 2 be a stable social choice function.
The no veto power condition requires that ( ) = ( ). But, since the allocation ( ) is not stable under , the stability of implies that ( ) 6 = ( ).
The structure of the problem (the social choice has two components: the level of the public good and the set of its users) as well as previous results in similar frameworks (see Bogomolnaia and Nicolò (2004) and Jackson and Nicolò (2004) ) suggest that in order to achieve e ciency and stability the selection of the alternative to be chosen and the group of its users must be separated. Therefore a two-stage mechanism seems to be a natural way to implement an e cient and stable social choice function. But before proceeding any further, there is another aspect that deserves to be briefly mentioned. Mechanisms constructed to prove general SPNE implementation results are unbounded and infinite. They contain, for instance, integer subgames (without Nash equilibria) or large out-of-equilibrium penalties. In contrast, our proposed mechanism has the following simple features: each player has a finite set of choices and strategies, out-of-equilibrium penalties may be (infinitely) small, and all subgames have Nash equilibria.
Since the maximal participation set ( ) might have several allocations, to define our two-stage game that implements in SPNE a social choice function selecting, for each preference profile R, an allocation in the set ( ), we need a selection rule on the subsets of . Let : 2 be any selection rule (i.e., (X ) X for all X 2 \{ } and ( ) ) with the following independence of irrelevant alternatives property: If X ( Y and (X ) 6 = then (Y) 6 = . For instance, if the set of alternatives has a linear order, the selection rule could choose from each set X its smallest alternative. Now, given , define the social choice function : R × 2 as follows: for each R, let ( ) = ( ), where ( ) ( ) and = ({ |there exists 2 such that ( ) ( )}).
Let : {1 } be a one-to-one mapping representing an exogenously given order of agents; namely, ( ) = means that agent is in the position according to the ordering . Let be the set of all ! possible orderings and denote by ( ) the set of predecessors of agent according to Namely,
To iterate a given order : {1 } , extend toˆ : N as follows:
given N, the number of agents, each integer N can uniquely be written as = + for some N {0} and 1 . Define this number as
Then, setˆ ( ) = ( [mod ]).
The Extensive-Game Form
Let : {1 } and : 2 be given.
• Stage 1:
or does not propose anything (identified as the proposal = ( 0)).
Assume that proposals ˆ (1) ˆ ( ) have already been made. Define
for some 1 } and let¯ be the maximum among { ˆ (1) ˆ ( ) } (set¯ = 0 if = ).
-Step + 1: agent =ˆ ( + 1) proposes either = ( ) \ such that ¯ or does not propose anything ( = ( 0)).
If after the first steps all agents proposed ( 0) then the game ends with the outcome ( ( ) ). Otherwise, let 1 be the first step such 
Strategies
A consumption strategy of agent in Stage 1 is a choice of a feasible proposal at each of 's information sets. We assume that agents only use stationary consumption strategies in the sense that, among the set of pairs previously proposed (if any), their decisions only depend upon those proposals with a maximum number of users. 6 Thus, 5 We do not put any restrictions on these -costs. In particular, and to be consistent with our ordinal setting, they can be non-transferable. But, if we embed the ordinal setting into a cardinal one, these -costs can be interpreted as monetary fines (potentially, infinitely small). These -costs are only used in the proof of our main result to take away from agents the incentives (which exist due to indi erences) of making a proposal that has no e ect to themselves (because, independently of whether or not this proposal is made, the proposer will not use the finally chosen alternative), yet the proposal has influence on the outcome of Stage 1. the stationarity of the strategies by applying the selection rule to the set of proposed alternatives with a maximum number of users, but then they would depend on the specific selection rule. 7 Note that if after the first steps all agents proposed ( 0) the game does not move to Stage
Outcome Functions
Given an order and a consumption strategy profile , let ˆ ( ) ( ) be the proposal made by agentˆ ( ) according to at
Step of Stage 1. Denote the path generated by by ( ) = { ˆ (1) ( ) ˆ ( ) ( )}, where is the last step of Stage 1. Given a selection rule : 2 , the outcome of Stage 1 generated by
where (ˆ ˆ ˆ ) is defined in the obvious (but tedious) way. Given a consumption strategy profile , we define the indicator function of agent , 1 ( ) , where 1 means that agent has made some proposal and none of them has been selected. Namely, 
that is, the set of final users is the set of agents who announced , ( [ˆ ˆ ˆ ]), as long as its cardinality is larger or equal thanˆ ; otherwise, no agent becomes a user. 
otherwise.
Additionally, to keep track of who has to burden the -cost, given an strategy profile ( ) , define: for each ,
The Implementation Result
Given a preference profile R we define, for each ordering and selection rule : 2 , the game in extensive form
The main result of the paper states that the extensive-game form = ( ) implements in SPNE the social choice function : R . Formally, Theorem 1 Let R , and : 2 be given. The allocation ( ) is the unique SPNE outcome of ( ).
Proof See the Appendix at the end of the paper.
Observe that Theorem 1 implies that the unique SPNE outcome of ( ) does not depend on . Moreover, Lemma 3 below states that no agent has to burden an -cost in equilibrium.
Lemma 3 Let
R, , and be given. Assume ( ) is a SPNE of ( )
Final Remarks
Extensive-Game Form
Our mechanism is less simple than we would like. First, in Stage 1 the order in which agents make proposals has to be iterated until all agents do not make new proposals (if reacts to 's proposal, should still be able to counteract). Second, proposers have to be burdened with a cost (which may be very "small") in the case that none of their proposals has been selected at Stage 1, or the proposerˆ of the chosen proposal at Stage 1 is either not a final user and/or the number of those who declared their willingness to be users in Stage 2 is smaller than the integerˆ proposed byˆ in Stage 1. 8 In the following examples we show that these features are indispensable. In each example we consider the extensive-game form described in Section 3, except that we remove from the original extensive-game form one of the above features.
Example 2 (The order of proposals in Stage 1 is not iterated) Let = { }, = {1 2}, and consider the following selection rule:
Observe that ( ) = {( {1}) ( {2})} Fix (1) = 1 and (2) = 2. It is easy to check that the unique SPNE outcome of the game without iterating in Stage 1 is 8 The idea of using either small penalties or awards in implementation theory is not new (see Abreu the ine cient allocation ( {1}) Fix now 0 (1) = 2 and 0 (2) = 1. Then, the unique SPNE outcome of the game is the allocation ( {1}) Hence, without the iteration of the order in which proposals are made in Stage 1 the SPNE outcome might depend on the exogenously given order, and more importantly, it might be ine cient.
Example 3 (To make a proposal is never costly) Consider the same , , , and of Example 2. Now, the ine cient allocation ( {1}) is a SPNE outcome of the game since there exists a SPNE in which agent 2 first announces ( 1) and then agent 1 announces ( 1).
Example 4 (The proposer that is not a final user does not have to burden a cost) Let = { } and = {1 2 3} Consider the preference profile = ( 1 2 3 ) R where agents 1 and 2 have the same preference relations as in Example 2 and let 3 be such that
Consider the selection rule of Example 2. Suppose that (1) = 3 There is a SPNE in which agent 3 proposes ( 1) in Stage 1, no other agent proposes anything else (since (X ) = if X ). Therefore, the final SPNE outcome is the ine cient allocation ( {1}).
Example 5 (Proposerˆ does not have to burden a cost when the number of agents willing to useˆ is smaller thanˆ ) Consider the same , , , and of Example 4. There is a SPNE in which agent 3 proposes ( 3) and the final SPNE outcome is the ine cient and non-externally stable allocation ( { }).
Neutrality
The social choice function : R implemented in SPNE by our mechanism is anonymous but not neutral. The equilibrium outcome of the game depends on the selection rule used to select a single alternative for each possible set of alternatives.
It is natural to ask whether it is possible to implement the social choice correspondence : R ³ , where for each R, ( ) = ( ) The answer is positive and easy for the case 3 Let H be the set of all possible selection rules. Add a preliminary stage in the extensive-game form in which all agents simultaneously announce some H Given R, if at least 1 agents announce the same then they play the game ( ) otherwise the game 0 ( ) is played with a prespecified selection rule 0 It is straightforward to check that, for all R, the set of SPNE outcomes of this enlarged game coincides with the maximal participation set ( ).
Group Stability
Our notion of stability refers to individual decisions. According to our definition a stable allocation is, in fact, a Nash equilibrium outcome of the game played once the public alternative is already selected (see Berga, Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2003) for more on this interpretation). We now want to establish the relationship between the set of e cient and stable allocations and the set of group stable allocations. We first state the definition of group stability. 
where ˆ is the maximal stable set of users ofˆ .
Proof Consider agent ( ) and let 2 Pre( ( ) ) be an arbitrary information set of agent ( ). By (Strict) agent ( ) orders strictly the two allocations (ˆ ) and (ˆ { ( )}) We distinguish between two cases.
and the SPNE outcome of the subgame starting at is but at all information sets
Thus, by the backwards induction principle, we can replace the information set of ( ) by the unique outcome previously identified, generated also by the participation
. Following the induction argument we obtain the uniqueness of the outcome and a SPNE strategy˜ (ˆ ˆ ˆ ). More- 
Proposition 4 Let R, , and : 2 be given. Assume ( ) is a SPNE of ( ) Then,
(2) ( ) is e cient under .
(3) ( ) belongs to the maximal participation set ( ).
Proof Since ( ) is a finite extensive form game with perfect information it has at least a SPNE in pure strategies. Let ( ) be a SPNE of ( ) and let ( ) = ( ) be its outcome. We first establish the following two claims. 
We distinguish between two di erent cases:
(
that is, nobody else made a proposal after ( 1), then by (1) and Proposition 3, does not have to burden a cost since his proposal has been selected. ¥
